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CAN KNOWLEDGE REALLY BE  
NON-FACTIVE? 
Michael J. SHAFFER 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of 
knowledge that weaken the factivity condition so that knowledge implies only 
approximate truth.  




The decidedly timeworn and orthodox analysis of the nature of knowledge is that 
knowledge is justified true belief. So, 
(JTB) S knows that p, if and only if,  
(i) S believes that p,  
(ii) S’s belief that p is justified and  
(iii) p is true. 
Though this analysis is now discredited, (i), (ii) and (iii) were supposed to be 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge. JTB was thus supposed 
to be a sort of decompositional and hence informative analysis of the nature of 
knowing. However, as we all now know, in 1963 Edmund Gettier (at least on the 
common interpretation) showed that the JTB account of knowledge is incorrect.1 
What Gettier specifically did was to present two cases where conditions (i)-(iii) were 
met but where our intuitions are supposed to be that the agent in question does not 
have knowledge.2 In effect Gettier challenged the sufficiency of the JTB account on 
the basis of the following sort of case. Consider the case of Smith.3 We are to suppose 
that Smith has strong evidence for the claim that Jones owns a Ford. This evidence 
                                                        
1 Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963), 121-123. 
2 It is worth mentioning that Gettier’s case for the rejection of the JTB account only follows as a 
deductive consequence given the assumptions of epistemic closure and the idea that one can be 
justified in holding a false belief. 
3 Gettier “Is Justified True,” 122. 
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includes that Jones has always owned a Ford and that Jones has just offered a ride to 
Smith while driving a Ford. Suppose also that Smith has a friend Brown and that 
Smith does not know where Brown currently is. So Smith formulates the following 
beliefs. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston. Either Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown in Brest-Litovsk. All three 
are entailed by the claim that Jones owns a Ford. But, suppose that Jones does not in 
point of fact own a Ford, say he is presently driving a rental car. Moreover, by 
coincidence suppose that unknown to Smith Brown is actually in Barcelona. This 
means that Smith meets conditions (i)-(iii) of the JTB analysis, but intuitively we do 
not believe that Smith knows that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. 
What has happened is that Smith’s belief has been caused in some inappropriate 
manner and the truth of his justified belief is, in some important sense of the term, 
a matter of luck. Of course, the intuition is supposed to be widely shared by 
philosophers and Gettier’s cases have been widely taken to refute the JTB analysis of 
knowledge. Importantly, in light of this result, many practitioners of post-Gettier 
epistemology have then been concerned with the offering of an alternative analysis 
of knowledge, prominently including “fourth condition” analyses (JTB+ analyses) 
that are intentionally designed rule out Gettier cases as involving bona fide 
knowledge.4  
There is, however, another line of thought that has arisen out of the challenge 
that Gettier’s ruminations about the adequacy of the JTB analysis. Specifically and 
even more controversially, some thinkers have raised concerns about the necessity 
of condition (iii) of the JTB/JTB+ analyses despite wide-spread agreement that it 
should be part of a correct analysis of knowledge.5 That is to say, these thinkers have 
raised concerns about the orthodox factivity condition on knowing.6 Most 
                                                        
4 See Peter Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy (1968): 157-170, 
George Pappas and Marshall Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), Robert Shope, The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), and Ram Neta, “Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility,” in Williamson on Knowledge, 
eds. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 161-182 
for a survey of the variety of post-Gettier accounts of knowledge. 
5 See, for example, Duncan Pritchard, Knowledge (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Robert 
Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), Laurence BonJour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary 
Responses (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989) and Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Mathias Steup, 
“The Analysis of Knowledge” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-
analysis/>. 
6 See, for example, Robert Ackermann, Belief and Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1972) and 
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prominently, Buckwalter and Turri have recently claimed that knowledge simply 
does not entail strict truth.7 Notice that dropping the factivity condition amounts to 
the contention that epistemic agents can, at least sometimes, know propositions that 
are false. This line of thought has some independent support in the form of 
observations concerning the prevalence of approximations in human cognition. In 
fact, a number of philosophers and psychologists have compellingly argued that 
rational thinking and acting involves the use of all sorts of approximations, 
idealizations and/or inexact truths far more often than epistemologists have 
previously acknowledged.8 That we are less than perfectly rational is, of course, not 
at all a new recognition and the work of the various defenders of the heuristics and 
biases tradition, the ecological rationality model and some more traditional views 
attests to this.9 What is most relevant here is that this line of thinking strongly 
suggests that we sometimes base both practical and theoretical reasoning on 
propositions that are not-exactly-true and that we can be efficient problem solvers 
and deliberators in even though we do not reason in maximally accurate ways on 
the basis of exact truths. In other words, we often trade degrees of accuracy with 
respect to truth for things like efficiency, ease of use and generality without 
seemingly compromising rationality or success. So, there is nothing at all unusual 
about employing approximate, partial or inexact truths in our epistemic practices. 
This sort of sentiment is reflected in claims about epistemic states and their 
acceptance like this one: “…epistemic acceptability turns not on whether it [a 
proposition] is true, but on whether it is true enoughthat is, on whether it is close 
                                                        
Allan Hazlett, “The Myth of Factive Verbs,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 
(2010): 497–522, 
7 Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri, “Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming). 
8 See Catherine Elgin, Considered Judgment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
Catherine Elgin, “True Enough,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 113-131, Nancy Cartwright, How 
the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), Elijah Millgram, Hard Truths 
(London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), Paul Teller, “Twilight of the Perfect Model,” Erkenntnis 55 
(2001): 393-415, Paul Teller, “The Finewright Theory,” in Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of 
Science, edited by Stephan Hartmann, Carl Hoefer and Luc Bovens, 91-116. London: Routledge, 
2008), Mark Wilson, Wandering Significance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and 
William Wimsatt, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to 
Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
9 See, for example, Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1986), 
Renée Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality (Oxford: Oxfrod University Press, 
2002), Massimo Piattei-Palmarini, Inevitable Illusions (New York: Wiley, 1994) and Gerd 
Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
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enough to the truth.”10 However, on this basis, one might be tempted to draw the 
rather extreme and pessimistic skeptical conclusion that we do not really know very 
much at all, especially if one maintains strict factivity of knowledge proper.11 
Moreover, on this basis one might be tempted to re-orient epistemology on 
something other than knowledge. Alternatively, dropping the strict factivity 
condition might be one way to avoid this extreme skeptical conclusion, avoid giving 
up on the concept of knowledge and take seriously the observations about 
approximation. The rather radical alternative proposal under consideration here is 
then that these sorts of observations about approximation are best dealt with by 
revising the analysis of knowledge itself. The most obvious and reasonable proposal 
of this sort, as explicitly pursued by Buckwalter and Turri, involves replacing (iii) 
with a weakened necessary condition related to factivity but framed in terms of 
approximate truth.12 In other words, the view in question here holds that we should 
adopt the view that knowing implies approximate truth rather than strict truth. Let 
us call this view the quasi-factivist account of knowledge. 
2. Quasi-factive Knowledge and Approximate Truths 
Quasi-factivism about knowledge is then the suggesting of something like the 
following alternative to the JTB/JTB+ analyses of knowledge: 
(JATB+) S knows that p, if and only if,  
                                                        
10 Catherine Elgin, True Enough (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), 16. Although Elgin does not 
endorse the view to be discussed here (i.e. that knowledge entails only approximate truth) she does 
suggests re-focusing epistemology on the concept of acceptance rather than on belief. See Elgin, 
True Enough, 3. The distinction between acceptance and belief is defended in L. Jonathan Cohen, 
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
11 Peter Unger infamously defended this position in his book Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975). The quasi-factivist view of knowledge is then pretty clearly intended to avoid having 
to draw this conclusion on the basis of the recognition of the prevalence of approximations in 
human cognition. Notice also that this line of argumentation very closely parallels the idealization 
argument against scientific realism as discussed, for example, in Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws 
of Physics Lie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), Lawrence Sklar, Theory and Truth (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), and Michael Shaffer, Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). More specifically, see Buckwalter and Turri, “Knowledge and 
Truth,” for an attempt to avoid this skeptical conclusion. 
12 See Buckwlater and Turri, “Knowledge and Truth.” They are explicit about adopting this view 
and claim that “We propose a fourth response: knowledge does not require truth (i.e. reject Line 
1). Instead, false but approximately true propositions can be known. Call this the approximation 
account of knowledge. On this view, representations need not be true in order to count as 
knowledge (5).” 
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(i) S believes/accepts that p,  
(ii) S’s belief that p is justified,  
(iii') p is approximately true and 
(iv) S’s justified belief that p meets the required “additional anti-luck 
condition(s)”. 
So, here (iv) (in an admittedly vague manner) is meant to indicate the idea that 
knowledge requires some sort of anti-luck condition necessary to secure reliability 
and stave off Gettier cases.13 More importantly for the purposes at hand, (iii') is the 
condition that knowledge is “quasi-factive.”14 Accordingly, given JATB+ one can 
know at least some false propositions, specifically one can know approximate truths 
when all of the other conditions for knowing are met. This might seem to be a prima 
facie compelling view given how common approximation and hedging are in human 
cognition, but is it really defensible to suppose that one can really ever know a false 
but approximately true proposition? The answer defended here is an emphatic “no.” 
This is the case because here are at least three serious problems with the quasi-
factivist view of knowledge. 
3. The Inconsistency and Explosion Objection 
The first problem for the quasi-factivist about knowledge has to do with the 
following deeply troubling consideration related to inconsistency, closure and the 
logical principle known as ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ). Suppose 
that the quasi-factivist about knowledge is right and one can know propositions that 
are approximately true. By definition all approximate truths are false and so the 
quasi-factivist about knowledge is thereby committed to the idea that some 
falsehoods can be known.15 Consider then a claim p that is approximately true ATp 
                                                        
13 See Peter Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy (1968): 157-170 
and Alvin Goldman, “Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence,” in Williamson on Knowledge, ed. 
Greenough and Pritchard, 73-91. There, concerning the JTB account, Goldman tells us, “It is 
obviously incomplete, and we have some fairly good ideas about how to repair it, or at least to 
improve upon it. That is not to say that there is unanimity among epistemologists. Nevertheless, 
some sort of additional conditions in an “anti-luck” vein are widely agreed to be necessary for a 
satisfactory account of knowing (75).” 
14 See Michael Shaffer, “Approximate Truth, Quasi-factivity and Evidence,” Acta Analytica 30 
(2015): 249-266. 
15 See Risto Hilpinen, “Approximate Truth and Truthlikeness,” in Formal Methods in the 
Methodology of the Empirical Sciences, ed. Marian Przelecki, et al. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), 19-
42, Theo Kuipers, What is Closer-to-the-truth? (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978), Graham Oddie, 
Likeness to Truth (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), Graham Oddie, “Truthlikeness,” The Stanford 
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and which is known, KSp, by some epistemic agent S. For example, suppose that (in 
the quasi-factivist sense), after properly conducting a rigorous measurement using 
measurement process M, Joe knows that the value of some measured variable x is 
5.6u but where the real value of x is 5.600000000001u.16 That the value of x is 5.6u 
is then only approximately true. On this basis, the quasi-factivist view allows for the 
following state to obtain KSp & ATp. But, suppose that S knows that p is 
approximately true KSATp and is aware of the fact that all approximate truths are 
false. Since ATp then implies p and (as we shall see shortly) knowledge is closed 
under implication (even for quasi-factivists about knowledge), in such a situation 
KSp and KSp. Returning to our example let us suppose then that Joe knows that it 
is only approximately true that the value of x is 5.6u and that, on this basis and his 
understanding of the nature of approximate truth, Joe knows that it is false that the 
value of x is 5.6u. So, Joe knows that the value of x is 5.6u and he knows that it is 
not the case that the value of x is 5.6u. It should be obvious that this is deeply 
troubling. Such reflective knowledge of approximate truths entails knowledge of 
contradictions. However, this is not even yet as brutally damaging from an epistemic 
perspective as it in point of fact turns out to be, because we have not yet seen how 
this gives rise to the problem of epistemic explosion. Let us proceed by looking a bit 
more carefully at the logic of knowledge and the extent of this problem will become 
clear.  
The standard axiomatization of the logic of knowledge is KDT.17 The relevant 
axioms that constitute this system and its stronger and weaker relatives are as 
follows: 
(K) KS(p q) (KSp  KSq) 
(D) KSp  KSp 
(T) KSp p 
(4) KSp  KSKSp 
(5) KSp KSKSp 
                                                        
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truthlikeness/>. 
16 Here “u” is some arbitrary unit of measurement. See Michael Shaffer, “Rescuing the Assertability 
of Measurement Reports,” Acta Analytica 34 (2019): 39-51 for some problems about these sorts of 
cases as they relate to approximation, assertion and knowledge 
17 See Vincent Hendricks and John Symons, “Epistemic Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/fall2015/entries/logic-epistemic/>. 
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(.2) KSKSp  KSKSp 
(.3) KS(KSp  KSq) ˅ KS(KSq  KSp) 
(.4) p  (KSKSp  KSp) 
What is of great importance here is that K in particular generalizes to the principle 
of closure for knowledge and even the logic of quasi-factive knowledge must obey 
K, though it explicitly does not obey T. The knowledge closure principle based on K 
is often then rendered simply as follows: 
(SCK) If KSp and KS(p q), then KSq. 
Now this version of the principle, the subjective closure of knowledge under 
material implication, says that if S knows p and also knows that p materially implies 
q, then S knows q. There is however a stronger version of the principle, objective 
closure of knowledge under material implication as follows: 
(OCK) If KSp and (p  q), then KSq. 
This version of the closure principle states that if S knows a proposition, then S 
knows all of the material implications of that proposition. In the argument that 
follows we need only assume SCK (grounded on the basis of axiom K) and stipulate 
that S is a reflective agent who knows the relevant implications built into the 
constructed (but totally generic) example introduced above. All of this guarantees 
that KSp and KSp implies KS(p & p). But, if this is true, then S knows everything 
due to the epistemic explosion problem that arises in virtue of ECQ and SCK. But, 
what exactly is ECQ? ECQ is a rather surprising but valid argument form in classical 
deductive logic. So it is a theorem of classical logic. Its proof is quite simple: 
P1: (p & p)     assumption 
P2: p            conjunction elimination [P1] 
P3: p          conjunction elimination [P1] 
P4: p  q        disjunction introduction [P2] 
P5: q            disjunctive syllogism [P3, P4] 
 (p & p)  q   conditional proof [P1-P5] 
Of course, this generalizes for any q whatsoever and so every contradiction validly 
implies every proposition in the context of classical logic. So if (reflectively) KSp & 
KSATp., ECQ is valid and knowledge in governed by SCK, then S would know 
everything. Based on the quasi-factivist account of knowledge, knowing an 
approximately true proposition in the reflective sense noted here logically entails 
knowing every proposition. But, this is absurd. Knowing a single approximate truth 
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should not entail omniscience. So, JATB+ cannot possibly be the correct analysis of 
knowledge. 
4. The Safety Objection 
The second, equally devastating, objection to JATB+ arises out of considerations 
having to do with the safety condition on knowledge. The safety condition for 
knowledge is a condition for knowing that has been most systematically defended 
by Williamson, Sosa and Pritchard.18 This condition, among other things, is supposed 
to ground the difference between knowledge and lucky true belief (especially of the 
sort involved in Gettier cases) by introducing an element of reliability into the 
definition of knowledge that is lacking in the case of luckily true beliefs. In other 
words, it is supposed to do the work required of condition (iv) of the JTB+ analysis.19 
The safety condition can be understood simply as follows:  
If S knows that p, then S could not easily have falsely believed that p.  
This relatively non-technical gloss on safety and it can be made more precise in 
modal terms as follows: 
(Safety) (wi ⊨ Ksp)  [<wi> ⊨ (Bsp & p)]. 
Here ‘wi’ is world i, ‘Ksp’ represents that S knows that p, ‘<wi>’ is the set of worlds 
sufficiently close to wi, and ‘Bsp’ represents that S believes that p. So understood, the 
safety condition is the claim that if S knows that p, then there are no worlds 
sufficiently similar to wi (including wi) where S (S’s counterpart in those worlds) 
believes that p and p is false. This regimentation of the safety condition captures the 
core idea of that condition well and the contrapositive of safety is also interesting to 
note:  
(Contrapositive Safety) [<wi> ⊨ (Bsp & p)]  (wi ⊨ Ksp). 
This version of safety essentially is the assertion that if S could easily have falsely 
believed that p, then S does not know that p. More technically, it is the claim that if 
                                                        
18 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Ernest 
Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141-54, Duncan 
Pritchard, “Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Synthese 158 (2007): 277-98, Duncan Pritchard, 
“Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries,” in New Waves in Epistemology, eds. Vincent Hendricks and 
Duncan Pritchard (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 28-51, Duncan Pritchard, “Safety-Based 
Epistemology: Whither Now?” Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009): 33-45, and Duncan 
Pritchard, Knowledge (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
19 See Michael Shaffer, “An Argument for the Safety Condition,” Logos & Episteme 8 (2017): 517-
520 for an argument that the safety condition is, in fact, implied by the JTB analysis. 
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in worlds sufficiently similar to wi S believes that p and p is false, then S does not 
know that p at wi. The easiest way then to see why safety should be regarded as a 
necessary condition for knowing is to understand what the denial of safety involves. 
It involves this: 
(Unsafe Knowledge) (wi ⊨ KSp) & [<wi> ⊨ (BSp & p)]. 
Knowing p at a given world is compatible with falsely believing p in worlds close to 
that given world. But, it must be the case that wi  <wi>. This because any account 
of closeness (i.e. any account of world similarity) must be reflexive and every world 
is maximally similar to itself. Thus, denying safety entails that one can know a claim 
at a world where that claim is false. But, this is absurd for all the familiar reasons. 
But notice now that, in virtue of JATB+, the quasi-factivist is automatically 
committed to the idea that there can be unsafe knowledge! In fact, according to the 
quasi-factivist one can have knowledge of p at a world where p is just false: wi ⊨ KSp 
& p. The problem then is that in adopting (iii') the quasi-factivist thereby 
automatically rejects safety and thus deprives themselves of this sort of reliability 
condition that allows for the satisfaction of (iv). This then deprives them of an 
important resource that allows for dealing with Gettier problems and other problems 
related to epistemic luck. Perhaps there is some other sort of account of a condition 
that could do the work of (iv) that is compatible with the quasi-factivist view, but it 
is at best unclear what this might principle be or even what such a condition might 
look like. 
5. The Moorean Objection 
The third objection raised here against the quasi-factivist view of knowledge 
concerns explaining the infelicity of claims of the following sort: “I know that p, but 
p is false.” Let us call these sorts of claims Moorean knowledge claims and they have 
the following form: KSp & p. Given JTB/JTB+ analyses of knowledge where the 
logic of knowledge is at least as strong as KDT the infelicity of Moorean knowledge 
claims is easily explained. According to T and its incorporation in JTB/JTB+ in the 
form of condition (iii), KSp  p and so the utterance of a claim to the effect that “I 
know that p, but p is false” is just the utterance of a (very) thinly veiled contradiction. 
For example, the assertion of the claim that “I know that electrons are negatively 
charged, but it is false that electrons are negatively charged” does not seem to be a 
legitimate assertion and according to the factivist about knowledge it is illegitimate 
because it is contradictory.  
For these sorts of reasons (and some other related ones) many variously 
motivated thinkers have defended the view that the proper norm for assertion is 
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knowledge.20 Timothy Williamson in particular has strongly defended the 
knowledge norm for assertion on this basis.21 In its most elemental form, this 
principle is the following claim:  
(KNA) one should assert a proposition only if it is known.  
Now, the knowledge norm of assertion has been subjected to considerable criticism, 
but it has also been vigorously defended by some influential contemporary 
philosophers.22 Williamson in particular defends the knowledge norm for assertion 
by appeal to its supposed explanatory power, especially with respect to the infelicity 
of Moorean belief claims of the form “p, but I do not believe that p.” Specifically, he 
argues that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the 
unassertability of such claims and this is, of course, closely related to the problem 
raised here about Moorean knowledge claims and the quasi-factivist view of 
knowledge. In mounting this defense Williamson claims that Moorean sentences are 
(1) unassertable and (2) that the best explanation of this fact is that knowledge is the 
proper norm of assertion.  
So why is the alleged unassertability of Moorean claims supposed to support 
the knowledge norm of assertion, especially in the case of factive accounts of 
knowledge? This is supposed to be the case because if asserting that p is governed by 
the norm of knowledge and knowledge is factive, then it follows that one should 
assert p only if it is true. Thus, on this version of the knowledge norm view, to assert 
a Moorean sentence is to violate the knowledge norm of assertion and the infelicity 
of such assertions is just a consequence of any version of KNA involving factivity. 
Essentially, one ought not to assert that p when p is not believed or when it is false 
because then it cannot be known according to the JTB/JTB+ interpretations of the 
knowledge norm. There are of course, several extant weaker proposals than the 
knowledge norm, but the same point will hold for any account of the norm of 
assertion that is factive.23 The problem then for the quasi-factivist about knowledge 
                                                        
20 See Jessica Brown, “Fallibilism, and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning,” 
in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, eds. Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 153-174. 
21 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
22 See, for example, Jonathan Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), Jonathan Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 105 (2008): 571-590, Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), Timothy Williamson, “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and 
Knowledge of Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 213-235. 
23 See Michael Shaffer, “Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of 
Practical Reasoning,” Logos & Episteme 3 (2012): 239-259, Michael Shaffer “Moorean Sentences 
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who endorses KNA is how to explain the infelicity of Moorean knowledge claims. 
Presumably, the only option open to the non-factivists about knowledge with 
respect to this issue is to deny that (at least some) Moorean knowledge claims are, in 
fact, infelicitous. According to JATB+ knowledge only implies approximate truth 
and in cases where we have the assertion that S knows p and p is false due to its 
approximate truth, there would be no need for an explanation of the infelicity 
involved. In other words, if JATB+ is correct, there should be no appearance of such 
infelicity and so there is no need to explain such infelicities. But these claims do 
appear to be infelicitous and so it is simply a mystery why this is so if JATB+ is correct 
and one endorses KNA.  
However, there is another related problem here about assertability that arises 
for quasi-factivists about knowledge who endorse KNA. Specifically, if JATB+ is 
correct and one endorses KNA, then it seems perfectly felicitous to assert 
contradictory pairs of claims. Given JATB+ let us suppose that Joe properly conducts 
a rigorous measurement using measurement process M and so, on the basis of (iii') 
in particular, knows that the value of some measured variable x is 5.61u but where 
the real value of x is 5.6u. Further suppose, that to be careful Joe rigorously measures 
the value of x again using M and obtains the result that the value of x is 5.59u and so 
also knows that the value of x is 5.59u. That the value of x is 5.61 and that the value 
of x is 5.59u are both only approximately true relative to the true value of 5.6u, but 
they are approximately true to the very same degree.24 But, that the value of x is 
5.59u implies that the value of x is not 5.61u and vice versa. Thus, unless the quasi-
factivist has some appropriate response, it appears to be the case that given the JATB+ 
account of knowledge Joe can know and assert both that “I know that the value of x 
is 5.59u, but it is false that the value of x is 5.59u” and “I know that the value of x is 
5.61u, but it is false that the value of x is 5.61u”. The appearance of infelicity in such 
pairs of cases of assertions of Moorean sentences is, however, undeniable and so even 
if the quasi-factivist somehow denies the infelicity of individual Moorean 
knowledge claims this is not apparently an option with respect to pairs of cases like 
                                                        
and the Norm of Assertion,” Logos & Episteme 3 (2012): 653-658, Ram Neta, “Treating Something 
as a Reason for Knowledge,” Nous 43 (2009): 684-699, and Clayton Littlejohn, “Must We Act Only 
on What We Know,” The Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 463-473 for discussions of this issue. 
24 Notice that this observation further exacerbates the inconsistency problems that the quasi-
factivist faces that were raised earlier. Notice also that such pairs (or larger sets) of such claims do 
not even need to be of the same degree of approximate truth. According to JATB+ knowledge 
implies approximate truth simpliciter and so an appropriately poised epistemic agent would 
potentially know every approximation with respect to a strictly true claim all of which are 
mutually exclusive. 
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these. So, this constitutes another serious problem for the quasi-factivist view of 
knowledge. 
6. Quasi-factivity, Knowledge-like States and Knowledge 
So, the conclusion defended here is that the quasi-factivist view of knowledge is 
deeply problematic and considerations related to the prevalence of approximations 
in human cognition should not be used to motivate and justify the rejection of 
factivity. This is simply because the rejection of factivity entails a whole host of what 
appear to be catastrophic problems for the analysis of knowledge and for 
distinguishing knowledge from less valedictory sorts of belief. But, this leaves us 
with the worrisome possibility that the prevalence of approximations in human 
thinking implies an extreme form of skepticism. But, there is a middle ground here 
and the far less problematic position is that the prevalence of approximations in 
human cognition indicates only that there may well be all sorts of knowledge-like 
states, including quasi-factive and justified doxastic states, with all sorts of useful 
features of both the theoretical and practical sort. First and for the reasons 
articulated here, such quasi-factive states involving approximations should not be 
confused with knowledge. Second, we need to see how such states relate to the sorts 
of skeptical worries that are alleged to motivate quasi-factivism about knowledge. 
But, this second question requires us to have a theory of knowledge-like states that 
can be brought to bear given these skeptical worries. So, there appears to be a 
pressing need to explore the nature(s) of quasi-factive states that involve 
approximations and are knowledge-like.25 
                                                        
25 This project is worked out in Michael Shaffer, Quasi-factive Belief and Knowledge-like States 
(Lanham: Lexington, forthcoming). 
